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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper suggests that EU‘s policy portfolio resembles the outcome of interstate 
bargaining predicted by federalist theory. We conclude that federalist theory, when 
combined with economic integration theory, is a robust tool for conceptualizing the 
EU  policy  portfolio.    The  result  is  a  dynamic  model,  which  we  call  ‗federal 
integration‘.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The EU‘s policy portfolio is extensive, with just about every area of public policy 
featuring in at least some way. It is, furthermore, highly complex, most particularly 
perhaps in respect of the varying degrees of EU involvement, which range from the 
extensive – as with, agriculture, fishing, and  external trade – to the marginal – as with 
education, health, and  social welfare.   
  The  complexity  of  the  EU‘s  policy  portfolio,  which  only  seems  to  be 
increasing, poses challenges for students of the European Union.  How is the nature of 
the EU‘s extensive and complex policy portfolio to be explained?  Is there a useful 
paradigm on which we could draw, and, what might be the variables we could study 
to enhance our ability to predict the evolution of EU policies and the parameters of 
EU-member state relations?   
WHY A TREATY-BASED EXPLANATION IS NOT ENOUGH 
 
The contents of the EU‘s treaties might be thought of as being the most useful place to 
start an examination of why the nature of the EU‘s policy portfolio is as it is. Do the 
treaty articles not stipulate what the EU must, can, and cannot do in policy terms?  
Have not the treaties been quite specific as to future policies not only listing these 
specifically, but complete with timetables. 3 
 
Unquestionably, the contents of the treaties are indeed extremely important in 
helping to explain the nature of the EU‘s policy responsibilities and activities, and in 
many cases, anticipated policy development.  On the one hand, they can serve to prod 
the  EU‘s  decision-makers  into  policy  action.  It  is,  for  example,  not  possible  to 
understand  the  focus  on  economic  policies,  and  more  especially  market-related 
policies, or of the special place of the CAP, without reference to treaty goals and 
stipulations. This prodding impact of the treaties has been especially effective when 
there has been a treaty-specified timetable for action – as with the customs union 
(which the EEC Treaty stipulated had to be created within 10-12 years), the SEM 
programme (which the Single European Act specified must be enacted by the end of 
December 1992), and EMU (which the Maastricht Treaty required must come into 
force in its third – single currency – phase by no later than January 1999).  
On the other hand, whilst the treaties do not actually exclude action by the EU 
in any  policy area, treaty provisions can  make  it  very difficult to pursue. So, for 
example, the treaty requirement that EU-wide laws in such policy areas as taxation 
and defence can only be made if the governments of all member states agree to the 
contents of these laws has been a key reason why there has been but limited policy 
development in these sensitive areas.  
But, important though treaty content is, by  itself  it provides only the  most 
partial of guides to what the EU does in policy terms. There are four main reasons for 
this.  First,  the  reasons  for  the  nature  of  the  contents  of  the  treaties  need  to  be 
explained. Why, for example, has there always been such a strong focus on market-
related policies? Why have policies such as research and foreign and security policy 
come to be given treaty recognition? And why are such policy areas as health and 
education given only limited and narrow treaty recognition?    4 
 
Second, several of what are now amongst the  most  important of the EU‘s 
policies had no specific treaty base in the early stages of their development. So, there 
were no articles in the Founding Treaties covering the likes of environmental and 
foreign policies, but this did not prevent these policies being actively developed from 
the early 1970s. It is true that as new policies have emerged and assumed important 
positions in the portfolio they have been given treaty recognition via the rounds of 
treaty  reform  that  have  occurred  every  five  years  or  so  since  the  mid-1980s.  But 
whilst this process of treaty recognition has certainly played a part in shaping the 
nature  of  subsequent  policy  evolution,  it  has  not,  as  environmental  and  foreign 
policies show, of itself been the original driving process behind the evolution: these 
policy  areas  were  given  treaty  recognition  because  they  already  were  receiving 
considerable policy attention.  
  Third, not only has the lack of an explicit treaty base not prevented policies 
from being developed at EU level, but the existence of a treaty base has not ensured 
that they have been developed. The clearest example of this is seen with transport 
policy, in respect of which Article 74 of the EEC Treaty said certain objectives  – 
mainly relating to cross-border transport – should be pursued ‗within the framework 
of a common transport policy‘. No such policy has been developed.   
Fourth, where there is a treaty base for a policy area, it usually does little more 
than set out a few guiding principles in the most general of terms. On the bases of 
these principles, it is up to the EU‘s decision-makers to develop specific policies – 
and there is usually the potential for them to do so in many different ways and at 
many different speeds.    
So, it is necessary to look beyond the treaties to explain the nature of the EU‘s 
evolving policy portfolio.  5 
 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION THEORY 
 
There  are  well-established  different  theoretical  perspectives  seeking  to  provide  an 
answer  to  our  question.  Macro-level  theories—following  the  concept  of  grand 
theory—would  include  the  usual  dyad  of  neo-functionalism  and 
intergovernmentalism.  Each theory is based on different assumptions.  Spillover, the 
dynamic  element  of  neo-functionalism,  which  rests  in  large  part  on  success  in 
particular policy areas resulting in policy learning and policy transfer to other policy 
areas, operates in significant measure via the political actions of supranational and 
non-governmental actors.  Intergovernmentalism‘s emphasis on the centrality of the 
state and on continued EU cooperation being a function of cost-benefit calculations by 
national governments leaves little doubt that policy is an outcome of member state 
bargaining.   
A key point for many of those who view intergovernmentalism in  its various 
forms as over-stating the policy-making dominance of national governments is that 
intergovernmentalism  concentrates  too  much  on  the  formal  and  final  stages  of 
decision-making.  If,  it  is  argued,  attention  is  concentrated  too  much  on  the  final 
decision-taking  stage  then  an  intergovernmentalist  perspective  is  almost  inevitable 
because  national  governments  –  operating  in  either  the  European  Council  or  the 
Council of Ministers – are bound to be seen as the key actors because important final 
policy decisions are always taken by them and in their name (usually in co-decision 
with  the  EP  when  legislation  is  being  made).  But  if  the  horizon  is  broadened  to 
embrace the whole process of decision-making  – which runs  from policy agenda-
setting through to policy evaluation – then, it is argued, the roles and policy influences 
of  many  policy  actors  in  addition  to  national  governments  must  be  recognised. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  argued  that  intergovernmentalism  pays  too  little  attention  to 6 
 
informal integration and the constraints that such integration imposes on the formal 
decision-makers. For example, Wincott (1995) suggests that the SEM programme and 
the accompanying SEA that gave it legal force, which Moravcsik suggests were the 
outcome  of  negotiations  between  national  actors,  are  in  important  respects  better 
viewed as the formalisation by national governments of what had been happening in 
practice for some time.    
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998 offer a rebranded neo-functionalism to develop 
a theory in which ‗[t]ransnational exchange provokes supranational organizations to 
make rules designed to facilitate and to regulate the development of transnational 
society‘ (25). In seeking to answer the question why integration proceeds faster and 
further in some policy areas than in others they ‗look to variation in the levels of 
cross-border interactions and in the consequent need for supranational coordination 
and rules‘ (14). 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (14) ask:  Why does integration proceed faster or 
farther in some policy areas than in others?’ They tell us ‗where the intensity and 
value  of  cross-national  transactions  are  relatively  low,  the  demand  for  EC-level 
coordination of rules and dispute resolution will be correspondingly low‘.  Example:  
The EU approaches supranationalism in the internal market because intra-EU trade 
and investment has grown steadily since the founding of the EEC.  ‗In contrast, there 
are few societal transactions that are impeded by the absence of a common foreign 
and security policy‘.   
  But is a lack of ‗societal transactions‘ an accurate explanation for an effete 
ESDP?  Defense spending is an area of enormous importance to key economic actors, 
some of which are pan-European (even transatlantic) if not in ownership, then in joint 
ventures  and  collaborative  contracting.      So  although  ESDP  is  a  national  and 7 
 
international  (NATO)  responsibility,  trans-European  corporate  mergers  and  the 
European  Defence  Agency‘s  (EDA)  goal  to  Europeanise  defence  contract  bidding 
would begin to create, under transactionalist theory, a more supranational policy.   But 
can we realistically expect that transactionalist behaviour would be the impetus for a 
supranational  defence  policy  in  democratic  systems  where  foreign  policy  is  an 
important factor in political party competition in domestic elections?   Additionally, 
polling  results  of  the  Standard  Eurobarometer  consistently  indicate  widespread 
support among citizens of member states for a European foreign and defence policy.   
So, as this brief discussion shows, there are apparent holes and weaknesses in 
grand theory as explanatory devices of the EU‘s policy portfolio. So, too, are there 
weaknesses in meso-theories such as policy networks and institutionalism which, to 
be fair, are typically employed primarily to identify actors and the nature of their 
interactions,  rather  than  to  explain  policy  development  in  an  overall  perspective.   
Such theories do reveal something about the nature of specific policies, but have not 
been especially useful in explaining and predicting evolution of the overall nature of 
the EU‘s policy portfolio.  
DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: FEDERAL 
INTEGRATION THEORY 
 
If there are limitations with the usefulness of established mainstream theoretical work 
in  explaining  the  nature  of  the  policy  portfolio,  how  then  is  extensiveness  and 
complexity  to  be  explained?  While  the  market  continues  to  be  at  the  centre  of 
European integration, political scientists sometimes ignore the economic logic driving 
integration. As long ago as the early 1960s the economist Bela Balassa observed that 
economic integration is both ‗a process and a state of affairs‘: when member states 
choose  the  path  of  economic  integration,  economic  determinism  comes  into  play, 8 
 
carrying the member states toward a ‗point of no return‘ when economic dependence 
(and  interdependence)  in  one  policy  area  triggers  economic  coordination  and 
interdependence  in  another.    The  remedy  for  the  unanticipated  side  effects  of 
integration is still more integration and an inextricable web of economic relations. 
  Economic integration theory, however, is not equipped to fully explain the 
political dimension of integration. This is where political integration theories come to 
the fore in assisting the ferreting out of the political and societal factors that condition 
and shape European integration despite the economic ‗logic‘ of integration. We argue 
that  EU  policy-making  processes  and  outcomes  closely  resemble  the  interstate 
bargaining  predicted  by  federalist  theory  (rather  than  the  intergovernmental 
bargaining  of  sovereign  countries).  We  conclude  that  federalist  theory,  when 
combined with economic integration theory, is a robust tool for conceptualizing the 
EU  policy  portfolio.    The  result  is  a  dynamic  model,  which  we  call  ‗federal 
integration‘.   
 
FEDERAL THEORY 
 
Most of the competing explanations of European integration share a common starting 
point:  that there is no analogue to the EU in the constellation of nation-states. The EU 
thus  has  a  ‗sui  generis‘  status or, to  quote  European  Commission  President,  Jose 
Barroso (2007), is ‗an unidentified political object‘.  If it is the case that the EU is an 
unidentified  political  object,  established  well-tested  theories  of  state-  and  policy-
building might appear to offer little in the way of explanatory power in the study of 
European policy development. But, as EU scholarship has increasingly recognised, 
the EU  in  important respects  is  not unique and has  followed certain recognisable 
paths. One of these paths is arguably a federalist.   9 
 
Federal  theory  offers  another  possibility  for  both  conceptualising  and 
predicting the evolution of the EU‘s policy portfolio. Scholars have long noted that 
the EU has federal characteristics, though most have stopped short of describing it as 
a federal system. But could it be that the same sort of ‗intergovernmental‘ bargaining 
that takes place between different levels of government in federal systems, which over 
time has resulted in a general movement of policy-making powers to the centre, is 
much the same in substance and process as that found among EU member states?  As 
was  reported  to  one  of  the  authors,  for  instance,  after  Slovenia  joined  the  EU, 
members of the Slovenian government were observing (paraphrasing), ‗We thought 
the difficulty in governing Yugoslavia lay in its ethnic composition, but the same sort 
of exasperating disputes and perpetual interstate bargaining that plagued Yugoslavia 
exist in the EU!‘   
Pinder  (1968,  1993)  and  Sbragia  (1992,  1993)  were  among  the  early 
proponents of the usefulness of federal theory in understanding the evolution of the 
EU. Why did they and others find it useful and why is federalist theory continuing to 
attract attention from at least some students of European integration? According to 
Burgess  (2004:  25-6)  ‗Federalism  seeks  to  explain  political  integration…as  a 
conscious  and  perfectly  rational  goal  of  European  national  states that  continue  to 
pursue their national interests in a world of turbulent international change‘. Sbragia 
(2007:  9)  has  recently  commented  that  ‗…thinking  of  the  EU  as  fitting  within  a 
comparative US-EU framework helps make it less ‗unique‘ and more susceptible to 
the ‗normal‘ questions of comparative politics‘. And beyond EU specialists, Vincent 
Ostrom (1987), a major federalist theorist, who advanced the influential ‗compound 
republic  theory‘,  has  suggested  its  relevance  for  ‗fashioning  the  institutions  of 
government for a European community and for a European society more generally‘ 10 
 
and  a  ‗useful  theoretical  apparatus…to  think  through  problems  and  make  an 
independent  assessment  of  appropriate  ways  for  addressing  the  problems  of 
contemporary Europe (p. 9). ‘ And there are scholars—such as  Kelemen (2001) who, 
in his study of social and environmental regulation in the EU, concludes that ‗the 
EU‘s regulatory regime functions as a federal state‘ (160)—see the EU as being quite 
distinctly  federal,  at  least  in  some  respects.      Nevertheless,  scholars  who  are 
sympathetic to a federalist approach are reluctant to explain EU policy-making and 
policy development in toto with federalist theory. Rather, the EU is seen as having 
federal ‗features‘.  So, for example, while Keleman (2001: 160) proposes a ‗theory of 
regulatory federalism‘, he explicitly limits the theory to ‗regulation and (the theory) 
does not claim that the EU is a ―federal state‖ in some larger sense‘.   
   So too do we take a qualified approach here. We do not suggest that the EU is 
a fully-blown federal system, but we do suggest that federalist theory is an excellent 
paradigm to examine and explain EU policies and policy development.  The learning 
that has taken place within federalist systems and the timing of the federalisation of 
politics, then, can be an invaluable guide in charting and predicting the EU‘s course. 
This is because the EU: 1) meets the prerequisites for federalism; 2) exhibits policy-
making responsibilities common to federal systems; 3) follows a similar historical 
development to that of federal systems.    
Prerequisites of Federalism 
 
The term ‗federal‘ is derived from the Latin ‗foederis‘, suggesting a league or alliance 
among  equals to act jointly  in defined policy areas. Precisely what this  means  in 
practice has been much debated by scholars, with some taking a strict and indeed 
restrictive view and others being more flexible and being prepared to regard a range 
of political systems as being essentially federal in nature. Scholars, in other words, 11 
 
vary in the particular prerequisites of federalism that they identify. For example, in his 
classic text on federalism, Wheare (1953) included amongst his prerequisites that the 
regional level units should share a need for a common defence and that there should 
have been some political association of the regional units prior to their federal union. 
These are prerequisites with which many scholars would not agree.  
But though scholars of federalism disagree on specifics, most would subscribe 
to the view that there  is a  list of  features that are at the core of  federal systems. 
Prominent amongst these features are the following: two levels of government – one 
central and one regional – exercise power and authority over the same people in the 
same territory; in the ‗division of labour‘ between the two levels, neither the central 
nor the regional government is subordinate; each level  has a sphere of significant 
independent policy activity; each level is sanctioned in a federal constitution and is 
protected by it; neither the central nor the regional levels can abolish the other; both 
levels have direct power over the citizens; and there is the availability of a federal 
capital  whose  location  is  acceptable  to  potential  divides  within  the  federation.  
Brussels,  interestingly,  lies  in  the  centre  of  a  fault  line  between  Romance-  and 
Germanic-speaking Europe, just as Washington, D.C. was placed near the fault line of 
free North and slave-holding South and Bern a fault  line  between Protestants and 
Catholics.       
There  is  not  space  in  this  paper  to  go through  each  of  these  features  and 
systematically apply them to the EU.  But even the most rudimentary understanding 
of how the EU is structured and operates shows it to display most, if not all, of the 
core federal features to a marked degree. To be sure, it might be argued that, for 
example, the EU‘s budgetary arrangements – which puts the main responsibility for 
determining the size of what is a relatively very small budget mainly in the hands of 12 
 
the member state governments – tilts the policy balance towards the regional level, 
but the EU is no different here from the fledgling years of all modern federations. But, 
whilst there may be characteristics of the EU that might make it less than a full federal 
system, that does not disqualify the usefulness of a federalist approach when trying to 
understand the nature of the EU‘s policy portfolio. 
  Policy-making Responsibilities  
 
In the previous section, it was suggested that the EU meets the essential prerequisites 
of  federalism.    This  section  explores  whether  the  EU  meets  the  second  test  of 
exhibiting policy-making responsibilities that are common to other federal systems.  
What is the division of policy responsibilities in federal systems?  Virtually all 
analysts  have  observed  a  similar  pattern  to  Watts    (1996)  who,  in  an  exhaustive 
comparison of the locus of policy in federations, showed that in most federations, 
foreign policy, defence, the functioning of macro-economic and monetary policies, 
major taxing powers, and inter-regional transportation are the responsibility of the 
federal  government,  while  education,  health  services,  social  services  and  labour 
(unemployment  insurance,  income  security,  pensions),  maintenance  of  law  and 
security, and supervision of local governments are usually assigned to the regional 
level governments. However, within this general framework, there is wide variation in 
terms of the distribution of powers and functions. Corporate taxation, for instance, is a 
concurrent power in the U.S., but exclusively federal in Switzerland.  
On the basis of this pattern it might be concluded that the EU falls some way 
short  of  meeting  the  federal  model  because  at  the  central  level  its  powers  are 
relatively weak in respect of the policy responsibilities identified by Watts and others 
as being federal in character. But, whilst this observation may indeed mean that the 
EU is not federal in a classical sense, it is undeniably the case that the EU level does 13 
 
exercise a very wide range of policy responsibilities, both on an exclusive and shared 
basis (see Table 1).  
Table 1: The Varying Extent of EU Policy Involvement 
 
Extensive EU  
involvement 
Considerable  
EU involvement 
Policy  responsibilities 
shared between the EU 
and the member states 
Limited EU  
policy involvement 
Virtually no EU 
policy  
involvement 
 
External trade 
 
Agriculture  
 
Fishing 
 
Monetary  (for       
euro 
members    
only) 
 
Market regulation 
 
     
 
Regional 
 
Competition 
 
Industry 
 
Foreign 
 
Environment 
 
Equal opportunities 
 
Working conditions 
 
Consumer protection 
 
Movement across  
     external borders 
 
Macroeconomic  
 
Energy 
 
Transport 
 
Cross-border crime 
 
Health 
 
Education 
 
 Defence 
 
 Social welfare 
 
 Civil Liberties 
 
 Housing 
 
  Domestic  
crime 
 
Source: Adapted from Nugent (2006: 388) 
Furthermore, if general rules can be deduced to ascertain the most efficient 
level at which policy is enacted and implemented, then federalism can afford to be 
flexible in the assignment of policy responsibilities. On this basis, the EU‘s division 
of  policy  responsibilities,  which  reflects  aspects  of  both  public  choice  and  liberal 
visions of the optimal level for where public policy should be made and implemented, 
can be seen as making sense. It can be so seen not least because of the heterogeneity 
of the EU‘s population, which means that relatively few goods are perceived as being 
collective  in  nature.  Hence,  social  welfare,  corporate  taxation,  corporate  law, 
education, and unemployment policy properly reside at the member state rather than 
the (federal) EU level.  14 
 
But though the EU may not be a pure federal system in policy responsibility 
terms, over the years it can be said to have been moving in a federal direction as it has 
assumed  increasing  roles  in  such  classic  federal-level  policy  areas  as  economic, 
monetary, foreign, defence, and citizenship policy areas. Moreover, in so doing it is 
reflecting the ‗federalism‘ of citizens who, according to Eurobarometer findings,  are 
increasingly lining up in a federalist manner and are revealing a federal conception in 
attitudes toward the role of the EU and members states in key policy areas. As Table 2 
shows, in response to the question ‗For each of the following areas, do you think 
decisions should be taken by Nationality (Government), or jointly within the EU?‘ a  
Table 2:  Attitudes toward Policy CooperationRESEARCH 
Policy Area  National 
Government Only 
Jointly with 
the EU 
Fighting Terrorism  16%  FIGHTING 
TERRORISM 
81% 
Scientific and 
Technological Research 
24%  71% 
Protecting the 
Environment 
28%  69% 
Defence and Foreign 
Affairs 
33%  62% 
Energy  35%  61% 
Support for Regions 
Facing Economic 
Difficulties 
35%  60% 
Fighting Crime  38%  60% 
Immigration  37%  59% 
Competition  34%  57% 
Agriculture & Fisheries  45%  50% 
Consumer Protection  48%  48% 
Economy  50%  46%  
Transport  51%  45%  
Fighting Unemployment  58%  39% 
Educational System  64%  33% 
Health & Social Welfare  66%  31% 
Taxation  68%  28% 
Pensions  72%  25% 
Source:  Standard Eurobarometer (2007), No. 67 
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clear  majority  favoured  ‗jointly  with  the  EU‘  in  fighting  terrorism,  scientific  and 
technological research, protecting the environment, and defence and foreign affairs.  
On  the  other  hand,  Europeans  feel  that  the  educational  system,  health  &  social 
welfare, taxation, and pensions are national responsibilities. These results demonstrate 
that on major governmental policy responsibilities, Europeans tend to think in terms 
of cooperative federalism.  This would strongly suggest that Europeans do not act as 
if the EU as an IO, but are responding as if the EU is a federal state. 
 
The Federal-Making Process 
 
Our third variable is ‗process‘—the idea that the EU is a federal system in the making.   
Haas and Schmitter (1964: 710) wrote that the integration process ‗must show  
evidence  of  increased  politicization,  of  shifting  expectations,  of  adaptation  by  the 
actors to a new process of mutual accommodation‘.  Having established that the EU 
meets  the  first  two  tests  of  the  applicability  of  federalist  theory  to  European 
integration, in general and the policy portfolio in particular, a final test remains: Are 
there similarities in the EU‘s federal experience with modern federalist states?    
Burgess (2004, 25) writes that: 
 
When  we  focus  upon  European  integration,  the  empirical  context  looms 
particularly large because it has transcended the familiar level of the nation 
state to the  level of an unknown  ―ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe‖  that  currently  includes  intergovernmental,  supranational,  federal, 
confederal, and functional elements.  This hybrid Europe, with its complex 
institutions,  structures,  and  procedures  that  defy  precise  definition  and 
categorization in conventional political science terms, is widely deemed today 
to be moving toward that finalité politque that looks increasingly like a federal 
destination.  Step by step, in piecemeal, incremental fashion, the European 
Community  has  evolved  into the  EU,  which  is  now  on the  threshold  of  a 
constitutional and political Europe that is nothing less than a federal Europe, 
but not necessarily a federal state as we know it. 
 16 
 
Burgess captures the political dynamic of integration as a federal process, which is 
very close to Elazar‘s notion of ‗thinking federal‘.  The process is critical to taking us 
from the snapshot notion of political integration to the dynamic or process approach.  
Indeed, a principal stumbling block in the application of federal theory to understand 
European  integration  in  general,  and  the  EU‘s  policy  portfolio  in  particular, 
presupposes that European integration follows a well-trod path of modern (federal) 
state-building.  Proving this is largely an empirical matter that is predicated on three 
rather  distinct  notions  of  ‗federalism‘  in  the  European  integration  literature—the 
federal ‗idea‘, constitutional federalism, and the federal process.  The federal idea—
which involves such questions as the building of dual nationalities (European and 
nation-state) and institutional reform (bi-cameralism with a directly-elected Council 
constituted  along  the  lines  of  the  German  Bundesrat  or  the  U.S.  Senate)—is  an 
interesting literature, but inappropriately normative for policy studies.  Constitutional 
federalism (cf. Dicey 1915—federalism as a legal compact) is best framed in legal 
studies,  typically  as  an  examination  of  the  evolution  of  the  acquis  communitaire 
through case exegesis of ECJ rulings.  
An inquiry of the federal process, on the other hand, should offer insight into 
the evolution and location of the policy portfolio. Friedrich (1968: 7) argues that any 
definition  of  federalism  ‗should  not  be  seen  only  as  a  static  pattern  or  design, 
characterized  by  a  particular  and  precisely  fixed  division  of  powers  between 
governmental levels‘. Rather, to fully comprehend federalism, it must be understood 
as a dynamic process.  Zines (1991, 101) reminds us that ‗If the history of federations 
teaches  anything  about  the  making  and  the  life  of  constitutions,  it  is  that  the 
predictability sought from form yields to spontaneity and inventiveness in practice.‘    17 
 
If  one  views  European  integration  as  a  federalising  process,  the  dynamic 
element  of  time  is  introduced  to the  inquiry.    This  brings  us  to our  final  test  of 
whether  federal theory  is appropriate to understanding the EU policy portfolio  by 
comparing the EU with that of modern federalist states. When European integration is 
examined as a dynamic process in the continuum between confederation and unitary 
organisation, the limitations of intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and critical 
political economy as explanations of European integration become obvious:  not only 
can  they  be  somewhat  static,  but  they  are  divorced  from  theories  of  nation-state 
formation and territorial organization.  
An important aspect of the dynamic process nature of federalism is the way in 
which  the  amending  feature  of  federal  constitutions  coupled  with  judicial  review 
combine to form two powerful  built-in  mechanisms  for change.  Austria, Canada, 
India,  and  the  U.S.  have  supreme  courts;  Belgium,  Germany,  and  Spain  (which 
political geographers often classified as  federal)   have constitutional courts;  and, 
Switzerland has a tribunal.  The Swiss case is unique in that the tribunal‘s power is 
limited to judicial review of cantonal  laws:  the validity of  federal  laws  is put to 
citizen referendum, taking on the role of ‗adjudicating umpire‘ (Watts 1996, 92 & 93).  
In addressing the issue of the role of the federal courts in the federal process, Watts 
(1996, 93) writes: 
The question is sometimes raised whether federation as a form of government 
results  ultimately  in  rule  by  judges  rather  than  by  elected  representatives.  
There is some element of truth in this and it is reinforced where the judges 
also  interpret  a  set  of  fundamental  individual  and  collective  rights  in  the 
constitution.  This has sometimes led to the advocacy of the popular election 
or recall of judges, although that has not yet been applied to the most senior 
constitutional court in any federation. 
 
Indeed,  the  ECJ  is  often  cited  as  a  federalising  institution  in  the  EU.    Zines,  for 
example (1991: 102), has argued that many of the problems that the ECJ has been 18 
 
called upon to adjudicate are similar to those once presented to the federal courts in 
Australia, Canada, and the United States in their formative years.  The ECJ‘s early 
rulings established the primacy of EU laws, signalling that the treaties would be dealt 
with  not  as  international  agreements  between  independent  signatories  but  as  a 
European (federal) constitution.  The ECJ mirrors the experience of the federal courts 
in the British-created federations such as ruling on concurrent powers, the reserve 
powers of the state, the necessary and proper notion (implied powers), and expanding 
the size of the commercial market.  Goldstein (2001: 16-17) concludes that ‗In effect, 
the ECJ transformed this international treaty into a higher-law constitution and thus 
transformed the EC into a nascent federated policy‘ 
Nevertheless, one can only go so far by citing the federalising dynamic of the 
ECJ. So while Stone Sweet (2000: 1) argues that the ECJ ‗has fashioned a kind of 
supranational constitution, and this law binds governments and the parliaments they 
control,‘ one must be careful to delineate the substantive difference in the cases that 
the ECJ is permitted to hear (the single market) and those that have appeared before, 
for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court since its inception.  The ECJ has not dealt with 
slavery,  land  claims  of  an  indigenous  people,  school  prayer,  abortion,  affirmative 
action, flag burning, homosexual relations, the right to counsel, and the hundreds of 
other civil liberties and civil rights cases that have shaped American federalism.  Even 
here,  however, the ECJ‘s reach  is expected to expand with the annexation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Lisbon Treaty, with the ECJ signalling as long 
ago as the Nice Treaty that the Charter embodied rights that had increasingly come to 
resemble a body of European common law.  In sum, while the ECJ‘s adjudication has 
been exercised mainly on single market-related issues (much of the U.S. Supreme 
Court‘s docket in the 18
th and 19
th Centuries), US federal courts have ruled on the 19 
 
constitutionality of state laws, federal laws, and executive orders, disputes between 
the states, and on all aspects of governmental power including the single market, civil 
rights, and civil liberties. 
 Governing  in  federal  systems  is  very  much  a  matter  of  bargaining  and 
compromise  among  constituent  units.    As  the  lesson  of  American  federalism 
especially illustrates, the tendency of people to look to shift policy to a higher level of 
government  in  time  of  crisis,  as  happened  in  the  abandonment of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation for the U.S. Constitution, is well established.  The EU is no exception 
to this pattern as demonstrated by the Europeanisation of food safety policy and in the 
current  Commission  proposals  drawn  from  the  de  Larosière  Report  (2009)  on 
financial regulation.  
If we return to the notion of federalism as the most geographically expressive 
form  of  government,  we  could  conjecture that  perhaps  the  experience  of  the  20
th 
Century European civil wars produced a Europe of realists who understood very well 
that  they  did  not  need  to  like  each  other  in  order  to  profit  from  a  quasi-federal 
arrangement.  Federalism, then, as Friedrich (1968, 7) argues, might best be viewed as 
‗the process (emphasis added) of federalizing a political community‘.     
In  conclusion,  federalism  offers  an  intergovernmental  perspective,  but  one 
grounded in a vastly different perception of ‗intergovernmental‘.   Utilising federal 
theory, designing studies to explore the bargaining of member states within a federal 
state paradigm produces far different policy predictions than a theory that presupposes 
member states operating in an anarchic international system.   
  Federal theory, however, lacks an important ingredient to understanding and 
making predictions about the evolution of the EU policy portfolio.  This is because 20 
 
concentrating  as  it  does  on  intergovernmental  bargaining,  it  does  not  address  the 
issues which draw together and increasingly bind constituent units.   
Indeed,  in the earliest  years of  integration studies, scholars recognised that 
both economic and political factors were usually important in stimulating integrative 
processes,  though they  did  not  always  agree  on  their  relative  importance.  So,  for 
example, Bela Balassa, the author of modern economic integration theory, noted in 
the early 1960s:  
 
In some political circles the economic aspects are deliberately minimized and 
the plan for economic integration is regarded merely as a pawn in the play of 
political forces.  Such a view unduly neglects the economic expediency of the 
proposal.  Even if political motives did have primary importance, this would 
not  mean  that  the  economist  should  not  examine  the  relevant  economic 
comparison, although the  formation of the United States was primarily the 
result  of  political  considerations,  nobody  would  deny  the  economic 
importance of its establishment (Balassa: 1961: 7) 
 
Also in the early 1960s, Haas and Schmitter (1964: 705) asked:  ‗Does the economic 
integration of a group of nations automatically trigger political unity? Or are these 
two  processes  quite  distinct,  requiring  deliberate  political  steps  because  purely 
economic arrangements are generally inadequate for ushering in political unity?‘ They 
advanced the thesis that ‗under modern conditions, the relationship between economic 
and political union had best be treated as a continuum‘ meaning that ‗definite political 
implications can  be associated with  most movements toward economic  integration 
even when the chief actors themselves do not entertain such notions at the time of 
adopting their new constitutive charter‘ (707). 
However,  notwithstanding  such  early  recognitions  of  the  importance  of 
looking at both political and economic factors in  integration models, over the years 
discipline-based approached have tended to prevail. So, for the most part, political 
scientists  do  not  emphasize  the  many  economic  factors  constraining  political 21 
 
decisions while economists have tended to play down the significance of political 
variables.  This impermeableness of theories can be explained partly by the different 
instruments political scientists and economists utilize in scholarly inquiry, but also by 
the questions they pose.  Economists tend to focus mainly on seeking to establish the 
optimum  conditions  for  achieving  economic  efficiency,  while  political  scientists 
investigate the underlying power relations among member states, their agents, and 
societal actors.  So while these two branches of inquiry have contributed significantly 
to our understanding of European economic and political integration, there has been 
an insufficient attempt to develop explanatory models that blend both the economic 
and political components of European integration.  This is problematic for the study 
of EU policies and policy-making because it is not readily apparent at which level—
regional, national, or supranational—policy should be created and implemented.  A 
paradigm developed to explain the evolution of the EU policy portfolio needs to take 
into  account  of  both  the  economic  efficiency  and  political  feasibility  of  a  policy 
dilemma.  
Illustrative of this point is the recurring debate among EU and national policy-
makers over the appropriate governmental level to locate corporate taxation policy.   
Some national leaders (led by France and Germany), citing a ‗race to the bottom‘, 
advocate  the  Europeanisation  of  corporate  tax  policy.  Other  member  states 
(particularly Ireland, the U.K., the Czech Republic, and the Baltic Tigers) insist that 
corporate  tax  policy  should  remain  under  the  sole  jurisdiction  of  national 
governments.    Economists  focus  on  the  extent  to  which  governmental  tax  policy 
disrupts  efficient  markets.  Political  scientists,  on  the  other  hand,  examine  actor 
motives  (among  national  policy-makers,  European  policy-makers,  and  interest 
groups),  the  decision-making  processes  (e.g.  Open  Market  Coordination  or  EU 22 
 
legislation?),  power  relations  (e.g  the  Commission  and  Parliament  versus  the 
Council),  and  the  policy  outcome  in  the  context  of  supranationalism  and 
intergovernmentalism. Whether a uniform (European) corporate taxation policy is a 
necessary ingredient in a federal Europe, however, is left unanswered by these modes 
of analyses.  
   
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION THEORY 
 
Writing in the early 1960s, the Hungarian economist Bela Balassa proposed a theory 
of economic integration.  According to his evolutionary model (depicted in Table 3) 
European integration would proceed via a predictable path of stages marked by 
increased integration. Within each successive stage, more policies would be decided 
upon and implemented at the European level. 
Table 3:  Balassa's Theoretical Evolution of Political and Economic Integration 
 
 
Balassa‘s approach was thus very much deterministic. We can consider its usefulness 
in the EU context by briefly looking at the stages he identified.   
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Free Trade Area and Customs Union 
 
In the EEC the creation of a free trade area and a customs union were not treated as 
separate  integrative  stages,  as  in  Balassa‘s  model,  but  were,  in  accordance  with 
Article 23 (1) of the EEC Treaty, developed simultaneously:  
The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all 
trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States 
of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent 
effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with 
third countries. 
This telescoping of the creation of a  free trade with a customs union  is the  main 
reason  the  UK  did  not  become  a  founding  EEC  member  and  created  the  rival 
European  Free Trade  Association (EFTA). The  UK realised that a customs union 
would have much wider integrative implications that it was prepared to accept. The 
EEC‘s founders, by contrast – who were fully informed by historical knowledge that 
customs duties have been enormously important as a catalyst for closer union among 
contiguous independent states – broadly welcomed the prospect of further integrative 
developments.  
Free trade in goods and the customs union were both achieved (for the most 
part) by 1968, in accordance with the timelines set out in the Treaty of Rome.  The 
customs union was a particularly significant integrative step because it necessitated a 
much higher level of cooperation and agreement among its members than do free 
trade areas.  This is so because the common external tariff (CET) that the customs 
union  required,  dictated that the  EEC  must  have  also  a  common  external  trading 
policy; otherwise, a CET would break down immediately if the governments of states 
that were subject to it were at liberty to negotiate their own terms of trade with third 
countries. The EU‘s common external trading policy – which is formally called the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) – is the most integrated of all EU policies and of 24 
 
the several EU policies that  are preceded  by the word ‗common‘ (as  in  Common 
Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy) is the one that is closest to truly 
being  completely  common:    it  involves  the  Commission  acting  on  behalf  of  all 
member  states  in  trade  negotiations  with  third  countries  and  in  multilateral  trade 
forums,  though  with  its  negotiating  positions  being  based  on  mandates  that  are 
approved by the Council of Ministers and with  all  final ‗deals‘ requiring Council 
approval. 
The existence of the customs union has also been integrative in its impact on 
the policy portfolio in that it quickly played an important part – and indeed still does – 
in stimulating member to seek cooperation, and indeed integration, in other spheres of 
external relations. If the EU can be a single and powerful actor in international trade 
negotiations,  why  cannot  it  also  be  one  in  respect  of  the  likes  of  environmental, 
transport and foreign polices?     
 
Common Market 
 
The common market adds the abolition of restrictions on factor movements (capital 
and labour) to the restrictions on trade in goods and services which were abolished in 
the  first  stage  of  economic  integration.  The  goal  of  the  Single  European  Market 
(SEM) is attainment of the four freedoms identified in the Treaty of Rome:  freedom 
of movement of goods, services, people, and capital. A fifth factor, entrepreneurship, 
is not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, but the EU has addressed the mobility of this 
factor  primarily  in  its  policies  promoting  freedom  of  establishment.  The  common 
market  is  the  EU‘s  signature  achievement,  and  clearly  has  been  important  in 
promoting  advance  in  such  key  market-related  policy  areas  as  environmental  and 
social policy.   25 
 
 
Economic Union   
 
This  phase  of  integration,  somewhat  incongruously  labelled  ‗economic  union‘  by 
Balassa,    involves  the  harmonisation  of  certain  key  economic  policies  (primarily 
employment policy and policies in some productive sectors such as agriculture and 
fishing), social welfare policies (pensions, healthcare), the health and well-being of 
citizens (consumer protection, environment, cohesion), and regional policy.  Many of 
these are not mutually exclusive; for instance, social cohesion policy is tied to regions 
whose eligibility is determined by economic measures.  We hinted in the previous 
section  that  as  more  variables  are  brought  into  the  equation,  pressure  builds  for 
integration  in  other  areas.    Neo-functionalists  would  attribute  this  phenomenon  to 
policy  learning,  but  economists  such  as  Balassa  would  see  this  as  an  inexorable 
outcome of free trade, which shows that closer economic growth can advance such 
economic desirables as growth and wealth.   
Applying this stage of Balassa‘s model to current EU policy realities, Table 1 
shows  that  the  picture  is  very  mixed.  So,  for  example,  regional,  labour  (working 
conditions, equal opportunities), and health and well-being (consumer protection and 
environmental) policies are shared between the EU and the member states, while the 
EU  has  limited  policy  competence  in  health  and  social  welfare.  Agriculture  and 
fisheries are the most integrated sectoral policies. 
A  particularly  interesting  policy  area  in  this  context  of  considering  the 
usefulness of economic theory to help explain the nature of the EU‘s policy portfolio 
is regional policy. One of the more consistent concerns about European integration 
has been the existence of regional disparities as measured by labour productivity and 
per capita income.  Common markets need to be concerned about regional disparities 26 
 
because  free  movement  of  factors  might,  in  a  combination  of  ways:  1) 
disproportionately  benefit  wealthy  regions  by  inducing  labour  and  capital  to  flow 
towards  agglomerated  industry;  2)  disproportionately  benefit  poorer  regions  by  – 
largely in response to wage differentials – increasing demand for the underdeveloped 
regions‘  products,  attracting  capital  and  labour, and  encouraging  the  relocation  of 
plants  (Balassa  1961:  204).  Concerns  about  the  near  certainty  that  some  poorer 
regions would find it difficult to compete in an integrated market, played an important 
part  in  the  creation  in  the  1970s  of  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
(ERDF).    
 
Economic Federalism 
 
This fifth phase of Balassa‘s economic integration model is equivalent to ‗fiscal and 
monetary  federalism‘.   Balassa (1961)  indicated that as  integration proceeded and 
interdependencies developed an increasing number of policies would have to be dealt 
with in a coordinated manner. At a minimum ‗in the face of integrated commodity 
and factor markets, it is necessary to have accord on basic goals, understanding the 
evaluation  of  current  trends,  agreement  on  the  strategy  applied,  and  reciprocal 
consideration  given  to  the  repercussions  of  any  unilateral  action  in  the  field  of 
monetary and fiscal policy on the economies of partner countries.  These common 
objectives are likely to include full employment, price stability, balance-of-payments 
equilibrium, and growth‘ (p. 268).  Most observers would agree the growth objective 
– much of which is embodied in the Lisbon Strategy – has become central to EU 
policy thinking and planning. 
Writing  about  fiscal  and  monetary  federalism,    Balassa  believed  that  both 
fiscal and monetary union would need to proceed simultaneously. ‗Concerted action‘ 27 
 
cannot be restricted to, for example, the monetary field ‗partly because integration 
impairs the effectiveness of unilateral  fiscal  measures, too, and partly  because the 
combined application of monetary and fiscal policy is likely to be more effective than 
the employment of only one of these policies‘ (Balassa, 1961: 270). Clearly there has 
been only a very partial such joint movement forward in the EU: the instruments of 
fiscal union are very weak and cannot be used in a Keynesian fashion to smooth out 
cycles in the European economy: there is an integrated monetary system, but it does 
not  include,  and  has  no  foreseeable  prospect of  including,  all  EU  member  states. 
Arguably,  both  of  these  weaknesses  have  resulted  in  very  damaging  policy 
consequences. 
   
Political Union 
Political Union is quite simply a federal system. Quite what is to be understood by a 
federal system has already been considered in the paper, so suffice it to restate here 
that  though  the  EU  may  not  be  fully  federal  –  it  does  not,  for  example,  have  a 
European  police  authority,  a  European  army,  or  a  constitution  –  it  is  much  more 
federal in character than is often recognised.  
In Balassan terms, political unions emerge gradually in response to a build-up 
of  inter-connected  factors.  So,  for  example,  an  ostensibly  economic  goal—free 
movement  of  labour—cannot  neatly  fall  into  the  common  market  phase  because 
people cross borders not only to work and to tour, but to engage in illegal activities, to 
escape  arrest  and  prosecution  for  crimes,  and  to  take  advantage  of  more  porous 
borders  to  enter  the  EU  without  the  proper  entry  visa.  Accordingly,  the  virtual 
complete  dismantling  of  internal  borders  in  the  EU  –  especially  for  Schengen 
countries –  has opened up a  need  for a wide range of common  justice and  home 28 
 
affairs policies. And, naturally, an expanding policy portfolio requires an increasingly 
strong political system, which since the mid-1980s has been brought about in each 
successive round of EU treatymaking.  
 
APPLYING A FEDERAL INTEGRATION APPROACH:  THE 
CURRENT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 
 
 
We  have argued that the steadily expanding and  increasingly differentiated 
nature of the EU‘s policy portfolio can be understood with a model that combines 
economic  integration  theory  and  federal  theory.      Our  position  is  that  federalism 
describes, informs, and explains EU policy-making in two ways: 1) in terms of the 
bargaining  that  takes  place  between  member  states  within  what  is  in  many  key 
respects a federalist system (rather than an anarchic state system); and 2) by historical 
comparison of similar circumstances confronting federal systems, and their respective 
policy  outcomes.    Understanding  is  further  advanced  by  linking  the  federalist 
approach to the Balassa economic model which lays out a sequencing of integration 
policies. 
  It  seems  to  us  that the  recent  developments  at  the  EU  level  in  respect  of 
tightening up financial regulation in the wake of the credit crisis provides such an 
instance  of  how  economic  theory  can  help  to  explain  this  coupled  with  federal 
experience in constructing such a regulatory system.  As in any federal arrangement, 
member states will enjoy competitive advantages, or seek to gain wealth even if this is 
and likely to be at the expense of their partner states.  This is inevitable behaviour, 
and, indeed seen by free market liberals as a desirable feature of federalism.   The 
point here is that the free movement of capital initiated in the common market phase 29 
 
had to depend upon the quality of the national  regulation in other member states.  
Naturally,  this  is  a  recurring  problem  when  actions  taken  by  companies  in  one 
member state negatively affect the economies of others.   Meanwhile, member states 
hosting these companies prefer to maintain regulatory control rather than surrender it 
to the central authority, while free market liberals prefer national regulation so as to 
enable the financial industry to vote with it feet.    
  An analysis of European financial market regulation can draw upon the many 
interesting parallels between the EU and the US in respect of the regulatory role of 
Washington,  and  increasingly  that  of  Brussels.      While  some  of  the  impetus  for 
regulation  can  be  seen  as  institutional  opportunism,  especially  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission,  it  can  also  be  understood  as  the  optimal  level  through  which 
governments can tackle market failure, and as Barosso himself has suggested in a 
series of press conferences and releases beginning in the fall of 2008, the internal 
market  is  the  bedrock  of  European  integration.    This  is  a  classic  illustration  of 
Balassa‘s argument:  to preserve the internal market (prevent a relapse into national 
protectionism), the EU would need to agree to financial regulation, and, thus move 
beyond negative to positive integration.   
  The de Larosière Group (2009), a high-level reflection group chaired by the 
former  governor  of  the  Bank  of  France  and  managing  director  of  the  IMF,  was 
convened at the request of the Commission, and charged with examining the cause of 
the financial crisis, and propose recommendations for developing a more effective 
system  of  financial  supervision.    The  de  Larosière  Group  proposed  increased 
supervision at both the macro- and micro-levels.  To improve macro-level prudential 
supervision,  the Group recommended replacing the Banking Supervision Committee 
(BSC)  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  with  a  new  committee  called  the 30 
 
European  Systemic  Risk  Council  (ESRC).    The  ESFS  would  be  a  decentralised 
network comprised of:  
  existing national supervisors who would continue to carry-out day-to-day 
supervision; 
  three new European Authorities would be set up with the role coordinate 
the application of supervisory standards and guarantee strong cooperation 
between the national supervisors; 
  Colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border 
institutions.  
 
The  Supervisory  Colleges  would  be  responsible  for  supervising  all  major  cross-
border financial firms in the EU by 2009.  This might encompass at least 50 financial 
institutions having a significant market share in another member state.   
The  current  ‗Level  Three‘  Lamfussey  Committees  [the  three  voluntary 
standards-setting bodies in Europe: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS),  CEIOPS  (Committee  of  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions 
Supervisors) and Committee of European Security Regulators (CESR)] would in the 
first stage take on supervisory powers (2009-2010), and, in the second stage (2011-
2012) become European Authorities (EU regulatory agencies) for each of the major 
financial  sectors:      a  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA),  a  European  Insurance 
Authority (EIA) and a European Securities Authority (ESA).  The Authorities would 
advise the Commission on regulatory and other issues, defining overall supervisory 
policies, convergence of supervisory rules and practices, financial stability. Quoting 
from the de Larosière Group‘s Report: 
Authorities would have the following key-competences: 
 
i)   legally binding mediation between national supervisors; 
ii)  adoption of binding supervisory standards; 
iii) adoption of binding technical decisions applicable to individual 
financial institutions; 
iv) oversight and coordination of colleges of supervisors; 
v) designation, where needed, of group supervisors; 31 
 
vi) licensing and supervision of specific EU-wide institutions (e.g. 
Credit Rating Agencies, and post-trading infrastructures); 
vii) binding cooperation with the ESRC to ensure adequate macro-
prudential supervision. (National supervisory authorities should 
continue to be fully responsible for the day-to-day supervision of 
firms.) 
viii) licensing and direct supervision of some specific EU-Wide 
institutions, such as Credit Rating Agencies and post-trading 
infrastructures. 
 
The Authorities would also enjoy the highest degree of independence vis-à-vis 
the European institutions, which would not interfere in the internal processes 
and  decisions  of  the  Authorities.  However,  the  Authorities  would  be 
accountable to the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission and 
report formally to these three institutions on a frequent basis. The Authorities 
would  be  managed  by  a  board  comprised  of  the  chairs  of  the  national 
supervisory  authorities.  The  chairpersons  and  director  generals  of  the 
Authorities  should  be  full-time  independent  professionals.  The  Authorities 
would  have  their  own  autonomous  budget,  commensurate  with  their 
responsibilities.    
 
 
  The report‘s recommendations were endorsed by the Commission  on March 
4,  but  the  Commission  signalled  that  its  legislative  proposals  would  call  for 
immediate  creation  of  the  European  Authorities,  bypassing  the  supervisory  stage.   
EcoFin, however, at its April Prague meeting, decided to strengthen and transform the 
Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees into new bodies with a specific legal framework, but 
signalled  that  discussions  would  need  to  continue  with  the  goals  of  achieving 
compromise in advance of the June European Council Summit:  (translation—there is 
opposition among some member states to regulatory bodies). 
  How can our model be brought to bear on this unfolding policy issue?   
  The Balassa model would predict that if the integration model was proceeding 
through the stages he identified that a firm regulatory financial system would already 
be in place.  Clearly no such system is in place, and the reason for that lies in the 
differences between the member states that have not been possible to resolve in the 
context of federal-type negotiations: for example, the UK has consistently resisted 32 
 
EU-level financial regulation because of its different style of corporate capitalism, its 
competitive advantage  in delivering  innovative  financial  instruments, and  its  more 
laissez  faire conception and practice of capitalism.   Federal theory,  however, will 
guide us in the different preferences of member states and how these preferences will 
play  out  in  the  bargaining  over  proposed  legislation.    States  with  comparative 
advantage in the development of innovative financial instruments – those with a more 
laissez faire conception of capitalism and those that stand to gain business by offering 
lax regulation – will be less inclined to accept what would undoubtedly be far more 
intrusive regulation of financial markets.   
  Economic theory, would predict that this mismatch between the current stage 
of economic integration and the lack of a regulatory framework for financial services 
would result in considerable economic difficulties, much as the mismatch between 
monetary  and  fiscal  integration  has  become  an  increasing  problem  within  the 
Eurozone.  Bringing the mismatch into line will depend upon the willingness of the 
federal partners to realize that compromise is necessary for the larger success of the 
federal project:  a willingness that is always more likely to emerge in crisis situations.   
  The frustration of Europe‘s weak and uncoordinated response to the financial 
meltdown as compared to the robust response in the US (particularly galling given 
that Europeans lay much of the blame for the crisis to lax US regulation) has been 
reflected in commentary and analysis over the past couple of months, with various 
proposals such as floating of European bonds that would give the EU some ability to 
employ fiscal measures to tackle the crisis on a European level.  At the same time, 
powerhouse  Germany  is  naturally  reluctant to  stimulate  its  economy  when  it  will 
benefit Italians and French, whose products Germans will purchase.  Hence, the EU 
finds  itself  in  a  fiscal  trap—the  EU  budget  too  small  to  make  an  appreciable 33 
 
difference in stimulating the economy and member states reluctant to borrow money 
to stimulate their national economies because they cannot ensure that stimulation will 
benefit  their  residents.    The  competition  policy  rules  (witness  the  Commission‘s 
request of the governments of France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden to explain their auto 
company bailouts) offer little room for manoeuvre, or, at least require member states 
to explain the national emergencies which would permit the suspension or lightening 
of competition rules.      
  Another  advantage  of  the  federal  integration  model  for  understanding  the 
evolution of and the component elements of the EU policy portfolio is its comparative 
value.  For example, what regulatory policies have federal states elsewhere been able 
to adopt that provide some measure of protection in their internal markets?  These 
policies may be next in line for EU decision makers to  adopt so as to be able to 
protect the integrity of and further develop the internal market. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding  its  usefulness,  Balassa‘s  model  is  first  and  foremost  a  theory  of 
economic integration. It predicts that once member states choose the path of economic 
integration, economic determinism comes into play, carrying members toward a point 
of  no  return  with  economic  dependence  in  one  area  triggering  the  necessity  for 
economic integration in another.  The game of ‗chicken‘ member states are playing in 
the  current  financial  crisis—stalling  of  stimulus  packages—and  the  prisoners‘ 
dilemma—bailouts of automobile companies that are member state based in name and 
identity  only—attest  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  competitive  game  playing    in  the 
inextricable  web  of  European  economic  relations  that  defies  unravelling  by  
economists  and  seasoned  policy-makers.  Standing  in  the  eye  of  this  financial 34 
 
meltdown,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  there  is  something  to  the  notion  of 
entangled economic linkages, where a decision to integrate in one area carries with it 
unanticipated side effects that are remedied only through further integration.   
Yet despite the seemingly inexorable nature of economic integration and the 
usefulness of the economic model in helping to explain the nature of the EU‘s policy 
portfolio, politics has a way of derailing ‗rational‘ policy. In spite of the unfinished 
common market project – as witnessed for example, by the ways in which energy, 
transportation,  and  services  are  all  still  largely  operating  under  national  rules  and 
enjoying  domestic  protection  –  most  member  states  ‗jumped‘  a  stage  when  they 
formed the eurozone (economic federalism).  Similarly, the EU‘s substantive policy in 
the field of justice and home affairs (political union) leapfrogged corporate taxation 
(economic federalism).  At its most simplest, the key relationships in  this federalist 
system are that  federal  level  institutions of different sorts, but including what are 
commonly-referred to in the EU context as supranationalist institutions do much to set 
the framework of policy discussions and negotiations, but the ultimate decisions are 
taken by the constituent units.   
   Thus, though it is very valuable as an explanatory device, Balassan economic 
integration theory is not equipped to fully explain the way in which national and EU 
policy-makers  and  societal  actors  have  conditioned  and  shaped  the  integration 
process.  For a more rounded account we need to combine federal integration with 
Balassa‘s model of economic integration.  This conceptual model that combines the 
theories of economic integration and federalism enables us to chart the EU policy 
portfolio dynamically: hence ‗federal integration’.    
   We are suggesting that the bargaining between the constituent governmental 
units (the member states in the EU context) is actually much more resonant of the 35 
 
nature of the bargaining process in federal systems than has been recognized.  Further, 
Balassa‘s economic integration theory is very useful in helping to explain at least why 
some issues come to be considered to require policy action at the EU level.   36 
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